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Abstract
We assess the severity of phishing attacks in terms of
their risk levels and the potential loss in market value
to the firms. We analyze 1,030 phishing alerts
released on a public database as well as financial data
related to the targeted firms using a hybrid text and
data mining method that predicts the severity of the
attack with high accuracy. Our research identifies the
important textual and financial variables that impact
the severity of the attacks and determine that
different antecedents influence risk level and
potential financial loss associated with phishing
attacks.
Key Words: Phishing, Data Mining, Financial loss,
Risk, Text Mining, Variable Importance.

Introduction
Phishing is a major security threat to the online
community. It is a kind of identity theft that makes
use of both social engineering skills and technical
subterfuge to entice the unsuspecting online
consumer to give away their personal information
and financial credentials [1]. Phishing caused an
estimated financial loss of US $3.2 billion affecting
3.6 million people from September 2006 to August
2007, showing its tremendous financial impact [2].
Phishing attacks not only cause financial loss, but
also shatter the confidence of customers in
conducting e-commerce. A recent survey found that
most customers of European banks only use online
banking to check their account balances instead of
conducting online transactions due to the fear of
getting phished [3]. Another study also reported that
the customer fear psychosis has resulted in a 20%
decrease in the rate of opening of genuine emails [4].
To make customers aware of latest phishing attacks,
some international organizations, such as Antiphishing Working Group (APWG) and Millersmiles,
and government statutory bodies have published
phishing alerts on their respective Web sites. Apart
from contextual information such as apparent sender,
return email address, content of phishing email, URL
of phishing server, and location of phishing location,
an anti-phishing Web site Millersmiles has
announced the associated risk level of phishing
attacks and provided security advice to the general
public. However, the risk level, which is based on the

technical sophistication of phishing attacks, may not
be directly related to financial loss caused by an
attack based on past research [5]. The financial loss
resulting from a phishing attack is always of great
concern to security administrators, investors and
consumers of an organization. In fact, both risk level
and indirect financial loss are complementary
measures because the two indicators may not be
correlated and a high risk level of a phishing alert
does not necessarily imply that the phishing attack
will result in a high loss in market value [5].
Therefore, assessing the severity of phishing alerts
using both these indicators helps to build a complete
picture of the impact of phishing attacks.
This research has several objectives. By
analyzing data related to phishing alerts using data
mining techniques, we aim to identify the key
characteristics of phishing attacks that determine the
risk level of phishing attacks. Secondly, we predict
the magnitude of loss in the market value of a firm
when it is targeted by phishers. Since direct financial
loss due to a phishing attack is difficult to calculate,
we look into indirect financial loss in market value
caused by phishing alerts.

Literature Review
Phishing has aroused great interest among
information security researchers. Understanding the
critical success factors of phishing and determining
methods that can prevent or detect such a crime has
been a popular area of research. We can roughly split
current research on phishing into three streams,
namely, phenomenal studies, economic analysis, and
technical research.
As an example of a phenomenal study
related to phishing, Jagatic et al. found that the social
engineering skill of the adversary was a critical
success factor for phishing [6]. Workman found that
the critical success factors for some marketing
strategies were applicable to phishing attacks as well
[7]. Researchers also found that education of
customers, standardization of technology, and
sharing of phishing information were among the
most important policies that could deter phishing
attacks [8].
Among economic studies related to phishing,
Singh studied a number of international phishing
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incidents and found that the direct financial loss per
incident ranged from US$900 to 6.5 million pounds
[9]. However, it is widely believed that as companies
are quite reluctant to disclose information related to
direct financial loss caused by phishing, the actual
financial loss might be ten times more than the
estimated numbers that appeared in research reports
[10]. In their attempt to estimate the indirect financial
loss caused by phishing, Leung and Bose found that
phishing related announcements caused a significant
negative reaction among investors of targeted
companies [5]. It is interesting to note that a
significant negative investor reaction of 2.1% loss in
market value within two days of the announcement
was reported in the broader context of analyzing the
economic impact of information security breaches
[11].
In the area of technical research,
information security researchers have toiled to
discover better countermeasures of phishing. Data
mining techniques have been used to filter out
phishing emails that contained fraudulent messages
[12]. By analyzing the headers of emails, researchers
were able to prevent the spread of malicious emails
containing virus/worms/Trojans and stop crimes such
as phishing and distributed denial of service attacks
with an accuracy of 99% [13]. To authenticate the
URL embedded in the emails, logistic regression [14]
and decision trees have also been used [15].
Text mining has also gained popularity as a
research tool due to its ability to mine digital content
available on the Internet. The most typical
application of text mining is in document
management involving tasks such as text
segmentation, key words extraction, indexing, and
text categorization. Wei et al. have used clustering
techniques and integrated information on personal
preferences for document management [16]. A hybrid
methodology that combined text mining with data
mining has been adopted by some researchers as well.
Ma et al. used text mining to analyze company news
and discover social networks among companies and
utilized the discovered characteristics of the social
networks to predict the revenue of the associated
companies using decision trees and logistic
regression [17]. Although text mining has been
frequently used in a number of domains, its
application in the area of information security is not
so common. Wang et al. used text mining to analyze
disclosures about information security incidents in
financial reports and determined if they impacted the
valuation of the firm [18]. We believe that text
mining techniques can be used to analyze text-based
phishing alerts in the same way for identification of
important textual variables that characterize phishing
attacks.
Prior research has demonstrated that
phishing as an online crime is growing in terms of

frequency of occurrences, financial loss imparted to
firms and their customers, as well as technical
sophistication. As there is a lack of research in the
area of assessment of phishing attacks, we are
motivated to construct a warning system based on a
knowledge based approach. In the context of security
breaches, past research has evaluated the impact of
the characteristics of the attack on the financial loss
generated by the security breach [11,19] but did not
find any significant relationship between them.

Data Collection and Analysis
In this section we describe how we collect, prepare,
and analyze phishing alerts to assess their severity
and determine important antecedents that influence
the classification.
Data Collection and Preparation
To determine the severity of phishing attacks, we
utilized phishing alerts available from the database
Millersmiles and financial data available from the
financial statements of the firms. The phishing alerts
data used in this research is the largest available data
at the time of research and was collected from mid2005 to mid-2008.
As phishing is primarily motivated by
financial gains, corporate financial data may be
relevant for the assessment of severity of phishing.
Relevant financial data that was reported in the last
month of the year prior to the release of the phishing
alert was retrieved from The Center for Research in
Security Prices. In the raw dataset, there were 168
financial variables. The authors conferred with each
other and an expert in the area of finance to choose
relevant financial variables that were appropriate for
the context of this research. This resulted in the
choice of 75 attributes related to the financial
performance of a firm. Then we used the Pearson’s
Chi-square statistic to determine the strength of the
relationship between those 75 financial variables and
the target variables. The top 25 variables for the
classification tasks (in terms of the Pearson’s Chisquare statistic) were selected. The list of those 25
financial variables appears in Table 1. As some
targets of phishing attacks did not have publicly
available financial data, (e.g., Internal Revenue
Service) some sample data was discarded at this
stage.
Table 1. List of Financial Data
The technical sophistication of the phishing attack
was measured in terms of the risk level of the attack
that was determined by the information security
specialists of Millersmiles. As for financial impact,
an event study was conducted to determine the
change in market value of the firm after the release of
the phishing alert, similar to the research done by
Leung and Bose [5]. First, all events related to

The 9th International Conference on Electronic Business, Macau, November 30 - December 4, 2009

Analyzing the Risk and Financial Impact of Phishing Attacks Using A Knowledge Based Approach

Variables

Mean

Std. Dev

Advertising_Expense

528.41

639.80

Assets_Total

65481.96

130713.00

Book_Value_Per_Share

24.61

30.93

Common_Equity_Tangible

14641.81

19161.09

Cost_of_Goods_Sold

14004.00

20477.22

52018.47

102523.14

10021.76

11791.06

Employees

61.20

113.79

Income_Before_
Extraordinary_Items

4262.38

5304.67

Inventories_Total

7679.02

20266.69

Invested_Capital_Total

86918.49

111025.53

Liabilities_Total

453071.57

635203.23

Long_Term_Debt_Total

60586.83

86909.57

Market_Value_Total_Fiscal

47621.20

56221.96

Net_Income_Loss

4271.03

5330.99

Notes_Payable_Short_Term
_Borrowings

45027.88

94363.77

Operating_Expenses_Total

20771.45

27889.17

Other_Intangibles

3281.63

6536.10

Preferred_Preference_Stock_
Capital_Total

407.25

1033.62

Price_High_Annual_Fiscal

51.19

21.34

Price_Low_Annual_Fiscal

35.90

16.60

Receivables_Total

244662.65

317712.00

Revenue_Total

31582.61

38778.60

S_P_Core_Earnings

4212.09

5058.42

Selling_General_and_
Administrative_Expense

7645.00

8144.54

Debt_in_Current_
Liabilities_Total
Earnings_Before_
Interest_and_Taxes

private firms were removed. Then events that were
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affected by some confounding events such as
mergers, acquisitions, dividend announcements, and
changeovers were eliminated from further
consideration. Then the stock return of the firm was
compared with that of a market index to determine
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of stock
prices of firms due to the release of the phishing alert.
We used CAR in this study because the change in the
stock price of a firm is a synthesized reflection of
various consequences due to phishing attacks, such
as loss of clients, shrinkage in market share, and
reduced confidence of consumers as well as investors.
A total of 1,030 phishing alerts in our sample data
had relevant CAR data and were subsequently used
for classification of risk level and CAR. The CAR for
these 1,030 phishing alerts ranged from -7.9% to
5.7% with an average of 0% and standard deviation
of 1.3%.
Numerical Experimentation
We used a 3×3×2 experimental design in this
research incorporating three sets of input data, three
classifiers, and two classification tasks. The design
included:
y
Textual data from phishing alerts, financial data
of the targeted companies, and combined textual
and financial data. Text mining techniques were
used on the phishing alerts to determine
important semantic concepts that could act as
input variables to the classifiers.
y
Three classifiers – decision trees (DT), support
vector machines (SVM), and neural networks
(NN).
y
Classification of risk level and CAR.
After the models were built, their performances were
compared using top decile lift as performance metric.
In addition, we also evaluated the relative importance
of the different input variables for the various models.
Further details about the experimental design are
provided in the following sub-sections.
Textual Content Analysis Using Text Mining
Text mining was used to convert free text of the
phishing alerts to structural data in the form of a
document-term matrix. We grouped similar terms
together so that the dimensionality of the documentterm matrix was significantly reduced. In fact, we
found that some of the frequently occurring words
had almost similar meaning and thus it was more
efficient to group such words together under a higher
level concept. For example, the terms ‘cash’, ‘refund’,
and ‘savings’ could be grouped under the concept
‘money’.
Usually, a dictionary which contained the linguistic
and semantic relationships between words is used for
grouping of concepts. We used the text mining
module of the SPSS Clementine data mining suite to
extract the key semantic concepts from the phishing
alerts that had its own built-in dictionary. After
grouping various terms under the broader semantic
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concepts, a document-concept matrix was built. Each
cell of the matrix represented the frequency of
occurrence of the concepts within a document (i.e., a
phishing alert). By performing this analysis, the
natural language of phishing alerts was converted to
structural data that could be used as input variables to
the classification models.
Development of Classification Models for Risk
Level and CAR
We first categorized phishing alerts according to the
risk level assigned by Millersmiles. There were
several predefined risk levels, namely, Low, LowMedium, Medium, Medium-High, and High. For the
sake of simplicity, we grouped risk levels Low and
Low-Medium to form a new group ‘Low’ and
Medium-High and High to form a new group ‘High’.
Next, we categorized phishing alerts according to the
CAR generated by them. Positive CAR indicated that
the market responded favorably to the phishing alert
whereas a negative CAR indicated unfavorable
market response. Although CAR is a continuous
variable we categorized it into three groups, namely,
positive, stable, and negative. The positive group
consisted of phishing alerts that resulted in CAR
greater than 3%, while the negative group consisted
of phishing alerts associated with a CAR less than 3%. This method of creating groups with the choice
of 3% as a threshold value was also used in prior
research [18].
In the subsequent modeling phase, we classified risk
level and CAR using input variables obtained from
textual categories or financial data or both. NN, SVM,
and DT were used in this research due to their history
of superior performance in other applications related
to information security [15]. The three classifiers
have different characteristics. NN consists of three
inter-connected layers, namely, input layer, hidden
layer, and output layer. Each layer contains
interconnected nodes than can process the data. The
interconnections are assigned weights that continue
to change as the NN ‘learns’ the pattern from the
input data. Because of the structure, NN is good at
learning non-linear relationships between input data
and output data. SVM views data sets as vector
spaces and performs classification by constructing a
hyperplane that maximizes the separation in order to
divide the vectors into different classes. SVM can
perform either linear or non-linear classification. DT
can tolerate the presence of outliers and missing data
and so minimum effort is required for data
preprocessing using DT. When processing
categorical data with more than two levels of value,
NN and SVM create dummy variables for each level
of value of the related input variable, and this adds to
the computational burden. In contrast, DT can derive
rules directly from categorical data without creating
dummy variables. However, DT cannot use
continuous variables directly and has to convert them

to categorical data. The DT model adopted in this
research was C5.0.
The risk levels and the CAR for the phishing alerts
were not evenly distributed. Table 2 shows the
distributions of the two variables. Therefore, for
classification of risk level, we oversampled the high
risk and low risk instances of data but kept the
medium risk instances the same so that the
distribution of the three groups became 1:1:1 in the
training and testing data sets. For classification of
CAR, we repeated the process by oversampling the
negative and positive instances while retaining the
stable instances in its original form. To build the
classification model, 70% of the oversampled data
was used for training and 30% was used for testing.
However, in the validation data sets, we retained the
original distribution of data. We also used 10-fold
cross validation and calculated the average accuracy
of the model from the cross-validation models.

Table 2. Distributions of the risk levels and the
CAR

Category

Count

Proportion

86

8.37%

Low

23

2.24%

Medium

919

89.45

Negative

24

2.33%

Positive

28

2.72%

Stable

978

94.95%

Risk Level
High

CAR

Results
In this section, the results obtained by applying the
trained classification models on the validation data
are presented. We evaluated the decile lift of the
models and then identified the important variables
discovered by the models for the two classification
tasks.
Decile Lift
In Tables 3 and 4, we showed the lift values obtained
for the two classification tasks. For classification of
risk level, the models assigned likelihood scores to
phishing alerts that indicated how likely it was for
the phishing alerts to be high risk. The top decile lift
was equal to the ratio of true high risk phishing alerts
among the top 10% of phishing alerts in terms of the
likelihood score of high risk divided by the ratio of
high risk phishing alerts in the whole population of
phishing alerts. The higher the top decile lift, the
better was the model. We used lift values to compare
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the model’s ability to capture high risk phishing
alerts. As shown in Table 3, the combined textual and
financial data always performed best in terms of top
decile lift up to the 7th decile. For SVM, the use of
only textual data was consistently better than the use
of only financial data in terms of top decile lift. For
DT, the performance using textual data was not as
good as that using financial data in the first decile but
was consistently better up to the 6th decile and for
NN the performance using textual data was better
than that using financial data up to the 4th decile. The
results indicated that analyzing the textual content of
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the phishing alerts was important for the
classification of risk levels of the phishing alerts. The
results also illustrated that combining textual data
with financial data made the classification more
accurate. Among the three classifiers, the
performance of SVM was the best for the top decile.
The top decile lift of the SVM classification model
using hybrid textual and financial data as inputs was
6.40. This meant that this particular model was 6.4
times more likely to capture true high risk phishing
alerts than random selection.

Table 3. Lift Values for Classification of Risk Level
Deciles
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Combined
DT
5.26
4.35
3.02
2.33
1.93
1.61
1.38
1.21
1.11
1.00

Text.
DT
4.07
3.17
2.50
2.02
1.73
1.55
1.35
1.24
1.11
1.00

Fin.
DT
4.09
2.98
2.40
1.99
1.70
1.50
1.38
1.25
1.11
1.00

Combined
SVM
6.40
3.95
2.91
2.31
1.93
1.61
1.43
1.25
1.11
1.00

Text.
SVM
4.40
3.52
2.54
2.00
1.75
1.59
1.38
1.21
1.11
1.00

Fin.
SVM
2.44
1.82
1.98
1.76
1.52
1.37
1.24
1.16
1.09
1.00

Combined
NN
4.77
3.49
2.55
2.06
1.67
1.47
1.28
1.13
1.06
1.00

Text.
NN
4.19
3.07
2.36
1.80
1.51
1.38
1.24
1.15
1.06
1.00

Fin.
NN
2.75
2.51
1.97
1.69
1.58
1.46
1.33
1.18
1.07
1.00

Table 4. Lift Values for Classification of CAR
Deciles
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Combined
DT
5.91
3.10
2.75
2.38
2.00
1.67
1.43
1.25
1.11
1.00

Text.
DT
4.76
2.75
2.70
2.20
2.00
1.67
1.43
1.25
1.11
1.00

Fin.
DT
2.90
2.86
2.68
2.50
2.00
1.67
1.43
1.25
1.11
1.00

Combined
SVM
8.52
4.76
3.17
2.50
2.00
1.67
1.43
1.25
1.11
1.00

The lift values obtained for the classification of CAR
are shown in Table 4. The results shown are
consistent with those in Table 3. Again, the combined
textual and financial data performed best in terms of
lift in most cases and the use of only textual data was
better than the use of only financial data for SVM but
not for DT and NN. Table 4 again illustrated the
importance of combining textual data with financial
data for the purpose of classification. As in the case
of risk level classification, the SVM model using
combined textual and financial data as inputs
obtained the highest lift value of 8.52.
Comparison of Important Variables
In order to understand the antecedents that governed
the classification of risk level and CAR of phishing
alerts, we calculated the importance of all input
variables. As the combined textual and hybrid data

Text.
SVM
7.72
5.00
3.33
2.50
2.00
1.67
1.43
1.25
1.11
1.00

Fin.
SVM
2.86
4.03
3.17
2.50
2.00
1.67
1.43
1.25
1.11
1.00

Combined
NN
7.62
4.76
3.17
2.38
2.00
1.67
1.43
1.25
1.11
1.00

Text.
NN
7.14
4.29
3.17
2.38
2.00
1.67
1.43
1.25
1.11
1.00

Fin.
NN
5.63
4.07
3.17
2.50
2.00
1.67
1.43
1.25
1.11
1.00

gave rise to good decile lift in general, we listed the
top five most important textual variables and the top
five most important financial variables identified for
each of the classification tasks using the three
classifiers with this data as input. The variables are
listed in order of their importance in Tables 5 and 6
where the column ‘Identifying Classifier(s)’ showed
which classifiers rated the variable as a top five
variable.
We can observe that there was no general agreement
among the classifiers about the most important
textual category. For classification of risk level,
‘update’ was identified as an important textual
category by all three classifiers. This implied that
phishing attacks with messages requesting recipients
to update their personal information were of high risk
level. For classification of CAR, ‘consumers’ was
identified as an important textual category by all
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three classifiers whereas ‘information’ and ‘writing’
were identified as top five categories by two of the
three classifiers. When phishers pretended to be
authenticated service providers and requested their
customers to reveal personal information, then such
attacks became likely to cause financial loss to the
customers, hurt brand reputation, and affect present
and future revenues of the company.
Table 5. Textual Concepts Listed in Order of
Importance with Identifying Classifiers
Risk
Level
Update

Identifying
Classifier(s)
DT, SVM,
NN

CAR
Consumer
s
Informatio
n

Identifying
Classifier(s)
DT, SVM,
NN

Security

DT, SVM

Email

DT, SVM

Writing

SVM, NN

Bank
account

DT, NN

eBay

DT

Bank

SVM, NN

Confirmat
ion

DT

Confirm
ation

DT

Warning

DT

Account

SVM

Person

SVM

NN

Account

SVM

NN

Work

NN

Computer
s

NN

Assets

NN

Informat
ion
Compute
rs

DT, SVM

shown in italic

In Table 6, the top five most important financial
variables identified by the three classifiers are listed.
There were no common financial variables for
classification of risk level and CAR. This showed
that the underlying financial variables determining
the two measures of severity of phishing attacks were
significantly different. For classification of risk level,
total of inventories was identified as an important
financial variable by all three classifiers whereas
other intangibles and advertising expense was
identified as a top five financial variable by two out
of three classifiers. These financial variables
indicated the preference of phishers towards
launching attacks on large firms. High total
inventories and intangibles is a hallmark of a large
firm and high advertising expense identified a
company that had greater media exposure. This
meant that large companies were preferred targets for
high risk phishing attacks because they had a strong
customer base and their customers were likely to be
misled by fake emails due to their inherent trust on
these companies. For classification of CAR, number
of employees, total invested capital, and total
liabilities were identified as top five financial
variables by two out of three classifiers. Again, the
number of employees and total invested capital
indirectly hinted at the large size of the firm. It was
interesting to note that firms that already had high
total liabilities were at greater risk of being penalized
by investors when phishing attacks took place and
shook
the
confidence
of
the
investors.

*Textual concepts common to both classifications are

Table 6. Financial Variables Listed in Order of Importance with Identifying Classifiers
Risk level
Inventories_Total
Other_Intangibles
Advertising_Expense
Price_High_Annual_Fiscal
Operating_Expenses_Total
Income_Before_Extraordinary_Items
S_P_Core_Earnings
Preferred_Preference_Stock_Capital_Total
Market_Value_Total_Fiscal
Common_Equity_Tangible
Earnings_Before_Interest_and_Taxes

Identifying
Classifier(s)
DT, SVM, NN
DT, NN
SVM, NN
DT
DT
DT
SVM
SVM
SVM
NN
NN

Discussion
Keeping in mind that it is important to evaluate the
technical sophistication as well as the potential
financial impact of phishing attacks, we conducted
this research and developed a mechanism to predict
the severity of phishing alerts in terms of risk level
and potential loss in market share indicated by CAR
of stock prices. From the list of top five most

CAR
Employees
Invested_Capital_Total
Liabilities_Total
Receivables_Total
Net_Income_Loss
Price_Low_Annual_Fiscal
Long_Term_Debt_Total
Assets_Total
Book_Value_Per_Share
Notes_Payable_Short_Term_Bors.
Debt_in_Current_Liabilities_Total
Cost_of_Goods_Sold

Identifying
Classifier(s)
DT, SVM
SVM, NN
SVM, NN
DT
DT
DT
DT
SVM
SVM
NN
NN
NN

important input variables generated using the three
classifiers, we found that the overlap for the two
types of classifications was consistently low and this
implied that risk level of a phishing alert was not
indicative of the CAR generated by it. The loss in
market value of the targeted firm could be added
with the information of the risk level by anti-phishing
organizations to give a complete picture of the
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impact of a phishing attack. Furthermore, our
research results indicated that assessment based on
data that consisted of important textual categories
discovered from the text of phishing alerts as well as
financial data of the targeted companies,
outperformed assessment based on any of the above
data items alone. Information security specialists
usually assess risk level of phishing incidents based
on the textual description of phishing alerts. Our
results indicated that for assessing severity it was
important to consider the financial condition of the
targeted company as well.
From an academic perspective, our research made an
important contribution in terms of application of a
hybrid text and data mining method for solving a
problem in the area of information security. Text
mining was used in the first stage to extract key
semantic concepts from the textual content of the
phishing alerts. The performance of the classifiers in
terms of top decile lift showed that the hybrid text
and data mining model was successful in classifying
different levels of risks and different types of
financial impact caused by phishing attacks. The
results were more or less consistent for the three
different classifiers and indicated that a hybrid data
mining model was able to generate consistent results
of high accuracy. Data mining techniques have been
frequently used in the past to filter out phishing
emails or thwart access to phishing Web sites and our
research showed that the same techniques could be
used to assess severity of phishing attacks effectively.
From a managerial perspective, our study paved the
way for automating the assessment of severity of
phishing attacks. As there are an increasing number
of phishing incidents that are reported around the
world every day, manual assessment of such
incidents could be time consuming as well as
inaccurate due to the subjective bias of the evaluator.
The method proposed in this paper automated the
assessment of phishing incidents using past data and
provided a richer assessment of such incidents than
what is currently being done by the anti-phishing
organizations. We hope that the findings of this study
can encourage anti-phishing organizations to adopt
our proposed method to predict the risk level as well
as potential financial impact of a phishing alert as
soon as it is reported on their Web site.

Conclusion
In this research, we adopted a hybrid text and data
mining model that used text mining to discover
important semantic categories from the textual
content of the phishing alerts and combined those
discovered categories with financial data of the
targeted companies to come up with classification of
risk level of the attack and the loss in market value of
the firm that it was likely to cause. The performance
of the hybrid model was quite superior in terms of
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top decile lift and demonstrated the need to consider
textual data as well as financial data for making
prediction about the severity of the phishing alert.
Furthermore, our results showed that risk level and
CAR were fundamentally different from each other
as we discovered that different textual and financial
factors impacted them. This implied that it was
important to evaluate both for fully assessing
phishing alerts – a practice we recommend that all
anti-phishing organizations should adopt in future to
make their members more knowledgeable about the
severity of phishing attacks.
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